German armed forces approaching outer space: the Air and Space Operations Centre as a gateway to multi-domain operations by Vogel, Dominic
www.ssoar.info
German armed forces approaching outer space: the
Air and Space Operations Centre as a gateway to
multi-domain operations
Vogel, Dominic
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Stellungnahme / comment
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Vogel, D. (2020). German armed forces approaching outer space: the Air and Space Operations Centre as a gateway
to multi-domain operations. (SWP Comment, 49/2020). Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik -SWP- Deutsches
Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit. https://doi.org/10.18449/2020C49
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.





NO. 49 OCTOBER 2020 Introduction 
German Armed Forces Approaching 
Outer Space 
The Air and Space Operations Centre As a Gateway to Multi-domain Operations 
Dominic Vogel 
With the establishment of the Air and Space Operations Centre (ASOC), the Bundes-
wehr is bringing together several capacities in one central facility. What sounds like 
science fiction at first glance is a necessary response to the growing military impor-
tance of space as an operational dimension. Space operations will not become part of 
everyday life overnight. In the medium to long term, however, the new centre offers 
opportunities for multidimensional integration that could prove to be a driver of 
innovation for the armed forces as a whole. In order to exploit this potential, addi-
tional personnel and structural adjustments are necessary. 
 
On 21 September 2020, the Federal Minister 
of Defence, accompanied by the chief of 
staff of the Air Force, opened the new Air 
and Space Operations Centre. Germany is 
thus taking account of the increasing mili-
tary importance of space, as other states 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) have already done. At the end 
of 2019, the United States established an 
additional partial force with the United 
States Space Force (USSF), while France 
renamed its Air Force in September 2020 
as the Air and Space Force (Armée de l’Air 
et de l’Espace). 
In Germany, the military responsibility 
for space remains with the Air Force. Since 
2009, the German Air Force has had the 
German Space Situational Awareness 
Centre, a facility where situation analyses 
for space can be produced, maintained, and 
evaluated. 
All over the world, military tasks relating 
to space are assigned to the air forces. In 
the United States, too, space operations fell 
under the responsibility of the Air Force 
until the USSF was established. This is due, 
quite trivially, to the proximity of air and 
space, but also – and much more impor-
tantly – to the compatibility of the tech-
nology and procedures to be used. Three-
dimensional spatial planning, radar tech-
nology, and high operational speed and 
range are characteristics that are among 
the core features of air forces and are also 
typical of space applications. ASOC there-
fore expands existing structures, although 
not to the same extent as in the United 
States or France. 
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Outer Space As an 
Additional Battlefield 
The military and civilian relevance of space 
has been increasing steadily and rapidly. 
Satellite-based technologies have become 
an integral part of our lives. Telecommuni-
cations and navigation are the best-known 
examples of services we depend on for free 
access to space technologies on a daily 
basis. Space infrastructure is therefore one 
of the critical infrastructures of our society. 
This dependence is even more significant 
for the military sector. Modern operations 
rely heavily on precise navigation, secure 
communications, real-time data links, and 
globally available reconnaissance sensors, 
all of which are delivered by space-based 
satellites. If some of these components are 
not available – even for a short period 
of time – certain assets can no longer be 
used, or can only be used to a limited ex-
tent. This could jeopardise an operation, or 
even make the success of an operation – 
whether for national and alliance defence 
or for stabilisation purposes – completely 
impossible. Without a precise navigation 
signal in conjunction with satellite-based 
communications, it is not possible to deploy 
unmanned systems or employ precision 
armaments, for example. 
This technological dependency results 
in a high level of vulnerability of the armed 
forces in regular service, but especially in 
combat operations. The armed forces can 
counter this vulnerability both defensively, 
for example through surveillance and eva-
sive satellites, and offensively with military 
means, such as anti-satellite missiles, jam-
ming transmitters, and laser weapons. 
In addition to these military threats, 
there is an increasing danger of satellites 
no longer functioning and the threat of col-
lisions due to so-called space debris. Here 
as well, ASOC shall contribute to the pro-
tection of our own space systems. 
Against this background, NATO declared 
space to be another operational domain 
at the NATO Leaders Meeting in London in 
2019. This means that space is now one of 
the potential battlefields alongside land, 
air, sea, and cyberspace. NATO emphasises 
its defensive orientation: It is not about 
offensive warfare in space, but about pro-
tecting against attacks or reducing their 
negative effects on allied forces, for exam-
ple by disrupting communications and 
navigation systems. In practice, this means 
that the alliance considers the space domain 
as a possible field of action in addition to 
the dimensions considered so far. On the 
military side, this requires not only the 
creation of certain technical prerequisites, 
but above all the adaptation of procedures 
and the development of personnel compe-
tencies, for example through specific train-
ing and deployment models. For example, 
the Bundeswehr has not yet recruited appli-
cants specifically for the space sector; in-
stead, it has always utilised personnel from 
other sectors and trained them accordingly. 
ASOC: A Cornerstone of 
National Command and 
Control Capabilities 
The London Declaration resulting from the 
Leaders Meeting was above all a signal and 
an invitation to the member states to think 
about and actively shape the space dimen-
sion. Germany is responding to this call 
by establishing ASOC, and thus covering 
all five operational dimensions defined by 
NATO in its armed forces, also in terms of 
command structures. Space operations, 
in the sense of building up own offensive 
capabilities, are not the goal of German 
efforts. As with NATO, the main aim is to 
protect the country’s own satellites and 
improve the situational awareness. In ad-
dition, alongside France, Germany has 
applied to serve as a location and sponsor 
for NATO’s planned Centres of Excellence 
(CoEs), which are to be centres of expertise 
for the alliance in the development of 
procedures and know-how. Together with 
ASOC, they could form a competence 
cluster for space operations in Germany. 
However, ASOC is not only relevant in 
terms of a further competence in the space 
domain. It also improves the ability to plan 
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and command the employment of air 
forces. 
Under the umbrella of the Centre for Air 
Operations, a 3-star command echelon of 
the German Air Force, several specialised 
centres have existed in parallel, including, 
for example, the Air Force Operations 
Centre (OpZLw) with the National Situation 
and Command Centre for Air Security 
and the Air Intelligence Center (AIC). The 
OpZLw is entrusted with the sovereign task 
of securing German airspace, preparing the 
joint air situation picture, and serving as 
the operational situation centre for the Air 
Force command and control. From here, for 
example, combat aircraft are deployed to 
intercept planes in German airspace in the 
event of a communications breakdown. 
The AIC is part of the military intelligence 
system. It is responsible for the so-called 
air threat situation, that is, it evaluates the 
capabilities of other air forces and contrib-
utes to the overall situation and target 
analysis. 
ASOC now combines these elements in 
the form of a central, cross-dimensional 
command and control facility. The Air 
Force is thus closing a gap by creating a 
national command capability. 
In a scenario of national and alliance 
defence within the NATO framework, a 
NATO facility would take over the opera-
tional command of the allied air forces. The 
German share of this contingent would be 
subordinated to the alliance for the dura-
tion of the mission. Due to the availability 
of airfields and the spatial relationships, it 
is likely that the Air Force would operate 
under NATO command but from German 
soil. To this end, it is necessary to continu-
ously secure and control German airspace 
against military threats, and to be able to 
command the remaining elements of the 
Air Force that are not part of the NATO 
operation during combat conditions. The 
Bundeswehr must coordinate all these par-
ticular aspects with the responsible bodies 
of the NATO command structure and the 
civil authorities. On the military side, this 
requires command and control facilities 
that can exercise national command and 
control and maintain their own planning 
capacities at the various levels. ASOC is just 
such an element. Thus, the centre not only 
stands for further capacity-building in the 
field of space, but above all represents pro-
gress in the efforts to establish a compre-
hensive national command capability. 
Approaching Multi-Domain 
Operations 
With the establishment of ASOC, the Bun-
deswehr is also taking account of a special 
operational feature of the space domain. 
Like cyberspace, the space domain has an 
impact on all other dimensions. Although 
air, land, and sea can more easily be con-
sidered separately, the cyber realm and 
space are now part of all military opera-
tions as a kind of cross-cutting challenge. 
No aircraft, no ship, no tank is fully opera-
tional today without satellite navigation 
and digital control systems. The increasing 
interdependence of dimensions and the 
resulting complexities and diversity of 
options for action require a new under-
standing of joint operations. 
For some time now, the concept of Multi-
Domain Operations (MDO) has been dis-
cussed in specialist circles, and the approach 
of a Multi-Domain Command & Control 
(MDC²) – in US terminology, also Joint All-
Domain Command & Control (JADC²) – has 
been developed. This essentially means a 
closer interlocking of the individual dimen-
sions towards uniform management and 
planning processes. Today, there is a hier-
archical and procedural separation between 
the operational joint level of the armed 
forces – for example, the NATO Joint Force 
Commands – and the subordinate tactical 
level with the individual dimensional com-
mands, the Component Commands. The 
joint approach has thus become a reality 
today, insofar as the individual missions are 
planned and synchronised with each other 
at the operational level, but carried out 
at the tactical level. This results in several 
independent planning cycles with different 
time horizons. MDC² is a concept that, in 
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simple terms, attempts to overcome this 
separation and unite it at one level of re-
sponsibility. In this way, armed forces could 
in the future more easily link effects in sev-
eral domains and gain an advantage in 
action. 
In order to become capable of MDC², 
methodological and procedural competen-
cies must first be developed, and the neces-
sary structures and processes must be cre-
ated. ASOC can be regarded as a first step 
in this direction, as it combines for the first 
time leadership responsibility for two op-
erational domains in one set of hands. It 
can serve as a nucleus for further develop-
ment and play a pioneering role for the 
Bundeswehr over the long term. 
Conclusions 
With the establishment of ASOC, the Bun-
deswehr has made progress in several fields 
of action. Above all, the expansion of capa-
bilities in the area of space surveillance and 
the increase in national command and con-
trol capabilities are very positive develop-
ments, and they should be further ex-
panded. 
Against the background of the parallel 
application of the planned CoEs, there 
should be a focus on cooperation with 
France, for example, appointing German as 
well as French nationals to top-level leader-
ship positions in joint organisational 
structures. 
In addition, the development of compe-
tence in the field of space should be further 
promoted. Here, too, it would make sense 
to seek international cooperation with 
allies and to train personnel specifically for 
applications in this area. In the medium 
term, it could, for example, be possible to 
recruit and train applicants specifically 
for careers in the space domain.  
With regard to the development of 
national leadership capabilities, the estab-
lishment of ASOC is an important first step, 
which should now be followed by others. 
The issues described above are relevant not 
only in the field of air and space, but also 
for the Army, the Navy, and the domestic 
territorial missions of the armed forces. The 
establishment or reorganisation of appro-
priate command structures for meeting the 
challenges posed by national and collective 
defence will require political attention in 
the next legislative period and must be pur-
sued as a priority, for example in the shape 
of a reform agenda. 
In the long term, the Bundeswehr should 
gear its command procedures towards the 
multi-domain approach. To this end, all steps 
must be conceptually oriented towards these 
requirements, and innovative, agile com-
mand concepts must be included in the 
planning process. 
Dominic Vogel is a Visiting Fellow with the International Security Division at SWP. 
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